Ghana ccommercial Bank Vrs Dakmak Rashwan Chemical industry And Others ( H1/155/2007) [2007] GHACA 2 (29 October 2007);
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF JUDICATURE
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL - ACCRA
CORAM - QUAYE, JA [PRESIDING]
MARIAMA OWUSU, JA
DUOSE, JA
SUIT NO. H1/155/2007
26TH OCTOBER, 2007
GHANA COMMERCIAL BANK … PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT
V E R S U S
1. DAKMAK RASHWAN CHEMICAL INDUSTRY
2. WEST AFRICAN IRON PIPES & FITTINGS … DEFENDANTS/
MANUFACTURING LTD. APPELLANTS
3. RACHAD FATTAL DAKMAK
4. ZAKARIA FATTAL DAKMAK
5. SADDALLAH TATTAL DAKMAK
6. AHMED ABDELRAHMAN RASHWAN
7. RASHWAN ABDEL RAHMAN
-------------------------------------------------------------------
JUDGMENT IN INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL
------------------------------------------------------------------
QUAYE, JA:- In the cause that is still pending final determination in the trial High Court (Fast Track) the plaintiff/respondents, who are a corporate body, established under the laws of Ghana to engage in the banking business, commenced the action by writ of summons on 5th April 2005, for the recovery of ¢18,033.477,450.14 which they alleged was the outstanding unpaid amount including interest on a 120 days deferred letter of credit facility of US$1,000,000.00 they granted the 1st Defendant/appellant on 27th February 1998. The facility was valid for 24 months, with a condition for review at six months intervals. The said facility was secured by the 1st Defendant/appellant with a landed property better described as Plot No. 56 Ring Road North Industrial Area, Accra belonging to the 2nd defendant/appellant. In addition the 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th and 7th defendants/appellants executed a joint guarantee for the facility. On the due date the 1st Defendant/appellant failed to liquidate their indebtedness. After the respondents had
formally made a demand for the payment, and upon failure by the appellants to pay, the respondents filed the said action.
The 1st defendant/appellant is a body corporate. The defendants/appellants jointly entered appearance per their Solicitor on 15th April 2005 and filed a defence on 29th August 2005. In their statement of defence, the appellants admitted paragraphs 1 – 6 of the plaintiff/respondent’s statement of claim. Those paragraphs inter alia recited the grant of facility aforesaid, the conditions attached thereto and the security and guarantees executed by the defendants/appellants in that behalf.
The second leg of the statement of defence was an example of what is known in law as confession and avoidance. SIEVERS VRS. BROWN 216 Miss 801, 63502d 217, 219 explained a plea in confession and avoidance as one which avows and confesses the truth of the averments of fact in the complaint or declaration, either expressly or by implication, but then proceeds to allege new matter which tends to deprive the facts admitted of their ordinary legal effect; or to obviate, neutralize, or avoid them. Indeed after the defendants/appellants had unequivocally admitted the facility as stated in paragraphs 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the respondents statement of claim, they devoted paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 of the statement of defence to denial of the debt alleging that the parties, that is to say, both the plaintiffs/respondents, and the defendants/appellants at a point in time, negotiated the outstanding balance of the debt, pursuant to which negotiations, the plaintiff/respondents agreed, to, and indeed, classified the debt as a loss, a bad debt, in exchange for the payment of a lesser agreed sum by the defendants/appellants. In the result of the compromise which was concluded between 1999 and 2000 and the accord and satisfaction received by the plaintiffs/respondents, the latter did not make any demand for the debt after the year 2000. In effect therefore, and visualizing with the eyes of the defendants/appellants, there is, no question whatsoever, of any debt between them and the plaintiff/respondents. Furthermore, the defendants/appellants claimed that, to underscore the accord and satisfaction, that is, the settlement negotiation between the parties, the plaintiffs/respondents did, in fact, release or return all the relevant documents and guarantees that the defendants/appellants had earlier on executed or handed over to
the plaintiffs/respondents to secure the loan back to the defendants/appellants.
The averments contained in the statement of defence prompted the filing by the plaintiffs/respondents on 5th September 2005 of a motion for interrogatories under Order 22 rule 1 of CI 47, the High Court Civil Procedure Rules (2004).
The questions put in the interrogatories were:
1. What are/is the name(s) of Plaintiff’s officials with whom the
Defendants negotiated the outstanding balance due and payable
by the Defendants?
2. When did Defendants negotiate the payment of the outstanding balance
with Plaintiff?
3. What is the name of Plaintiff’s official who agreed to classify the debt
as a loss in exchange for payment of a lesser sum by the Defendants?
4. When did Plaintiff agree to classify the debt as a loss in exchange for
payment of a lesser sum by the Defendants?
5a. Has (sic) the Defendants made any payment to the Plaintiff?
5b. If so, how much have Defendants paid to the Plaintiff?
5c. When did the Defendants make such payment(s) to the Plaintiff?
5d. Which official of the Plaintiff was the payment(s) made to?
5e. Which of Plaintiff’s branches was the payment(s) made to?
5f. Do the Defendants have any receipts of payment(s) made to Plaintiff?
6. Which of Plaintiff’s officials received the accord and satisfaction from
Defendants?
7a Was the accord and satisfaction signed by the Plaintiffs or its
officials?
7b. If so which of Plaintiff’s officials signed the accord and satisfaction?
8. Do the Defendants have a copy of the accord and satisfaction?
9a. When did Plaintiff discharge the Guarantee which was provided as
security by the Defendants?
9b. Which official of the Plaintiff discharged the Guarantee?
10a. When did Plaintiff discharge the Mortgage which was provided by the
Defendants as security?
10b. Which official of the Plaintiff discharged the mortgage.
10.c Did the said Plaintiff’s official execute a Deed of Discharge?
10d. Do the Defendants have a copy of the Deed of Discharge?
11. What is the name of Plaintiff’s official who returned to the
Defendants the relevant documents used as security for the facility?
12. When were the relevant documents used as security for the facility
returned to the Defendants by the Plaintiff?
13. Who are the other financiers with whom the said property Plot. No.
56 Ring Road North Industrial Area has been used as security for
other facilities.
The Defendants are required to answer all the interrogatories….”
After the plaintiffs/respondents had filed a reply to the defendants’ statement of defence on 5th October 2005, the defendants/appellants filed an affidavit in opposition to the motion for interrogatories on 19th October 2005.
The deponent thereto, one Fady Dakmak who held himself up to be the managing director of the 1st Defendant took serious issue with the propriety of the interrogatories. The relevant paragraphs of the affidavit in opposition are hereby reproduced.
“6. That the Defendants/Respondents delivered a defence contending
that the Defendants/Respondents had reached a compromise with
the Plaintiff/Applicant whereby the Defendants/Respondents paid a
lesser sum in full and final satisfaction of the debt.
7. That the Defendants/Respondents further alleged that pursuant to the
said settlement, Plaintiff/Applicant had discharged the securities provided
and consequently that the Plaintiff/applicant is put to straight (sic)
proof of the allegation of a subsisting mortgage and directors guarantee.
8. That since a subsequent realization that the Plaintiff/Applicant cannot prove
the allegations in the Statement of Claim, the Plaintiff/Applicant’s solicitors
have resorted to a monstrous Police complaint that the Defendants/
Respondents had stolen the security documents from the custody of the
Plaintiff/Applicant.
9. That realizing the futility in the said Police complaint, the Plaintiff/
Applicant resorted to the presently misconstrued application in a bid
to avoid its legal and evidentiary burdens of proof.
10. ….that this application is far from the nature and kinds of matters
warranted by order 22 r. 1 and as such is not only pre-mature
but is totally misconceived.
11. That at all material times prior to the settlement, the documents
were in the possession of the Plaintiff/Applicant and it is only
the Plaintiff/Applicant who is in a position to know the whereabouts
of the documents. This is more so when Plaintiff/Applicant claims
it holds subsisting securities provided by the Defendants/
Respondents…”
The motion for leave to file interrogations was argued in the trial court on 17th November 2005. By the ruling delivered on 5th December 2005, the trial court failed to yield to the submissions of the defendant/appellant herein.
The appeal before us is principally calling upon us to overturn the ruling of the trial court that the interrogatories should be answered.
Learned Counsel for the appellants filed as many as eight grounds of appeal alleging error of judgment and it is to these that we now turn.
I should remark however, that the issue of interrogatories has not been very much tested and pronounced upon in our courts in Ghana. In view of this fact, there are hardly any decided authorities on the issue. We are bound therefore to fall on the rationnes decidendi of foreign decisions to find out the guiding principles regarding interrogatories.
Order 22 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules 2004 CI 47 contains specifically rules that the Ghanaian Courts and practitioners should follow.
Order 22 r 1(1) vests in any party to an action the right or election to apply for leave to serve another party with interrogatories Sub rule (4) of rule 1 states the guiding parameters to the court, that in granting leave to file interrogatories, “the court shall give leave only of the interrogatories which it considers necessary either to dispose fairly of the cause or matter or to save costs.” This provision does not, with respect show when it is appropriate to file leave for interrogatories. Authorities however tend to show that at any time after the defendant has filed a statement of defence, or at the summons for directions stage, a party may file an application for leave. It is my respectful view that until the summons for directions stage might pose problems, unless the summons shall be deferred and made subject to the discovery by way of interrogatories. My view is fuelled by the reasoning that the issues to set down for trial might not have been firmly formulated while questions put by way of interrogatories were pending answer. I am satisfied therefore that in this case, the stage at which the application for leave to file interrogatories was filed was proper, and not pre-mature,
since both the current rules Order 22 of CI 47, the previous rules as well, and Order 31 of LN 140A, the 1954 rules, deliberately omitted to pin the applicant down to specific time to file an application for leave. I agree with the view that the application cannot be filed before the defendant files his statement of defence since that would inform the plaintiff as to what questions to put. If it is the defendant who intends to file interrogatories, he would have been confronted with or got to know from the plaintiff’s statement of claim, what the cause of action is about or how it arose .
Order 31 of LN 140A provides
“1. In any cause or matter the plaintiff or defendant by leave of the court
or a Judge may deliver interrogatories in writing for the examination
of the opposite parties,…”
Counsel for the appellant contends in ground 1 of his appeal that the trial judge erred when he held that upon a proper construction of Order 1 rule 2 and Order 22 rules 1 and 4 of CI 47…..the emphasis for the grant of the order of interrogatories was speedy adjudication and cost saving and not fairness and effective justice….” With respect to learned counsel for the appellant, even though I do concede as he has ably urged upon us, that questions of fairness, effective justice, cost, and time saving, are monumental principles which should guide and regulate the grant or refusal to grant leave to file interrogatories, it is not fair in this case, after making a careful reading and study of the entire ruling, to conclude that the trial judge rested his ruling or intended to base it only on cost saving to the detriment of the other considerations.
The authors of the text book “Discovery,” Paul Matthews and Hodge M. Malek have carefully set out the parameters and purpose of interrogatories. The objectives are:
(a) to obtain admissions,
(b) to reveal weaknesses in the other party’s case;
(c) to obtain information as to material facts which the applicant needs
to prove in support of his case; (d) to ascertain details of aspects of the other party’s case so as to reduce surprise
at the exchange of witness statements stage or trial; and
(e) to narrow the issues between the parties and thus reduce the expenses and
length of trial.
It is obvious from the above general nature of interrogatories that the items identified constitute to, and are in fact, integral parts of administering fair judgment. Although the above general principles do not specifically include or mention fairness, that ingredient loudly presents itself as a sine qua non in the exercise of the court’s discretion as to whether to grant or refuse the application for leave to interrogate. The provision in Order 22 of CI 47 conclusively makes the duty to be fair, obligatory to the courts. I therefore agree with learned counsel for the applicant that the concepts of fairness and effective justice and speed and costs are equally important, although I must add that all the other ingredients are, and form part of the ultimate goal of achieving and dispensing fair judgment. This fact was not lost on the trial judge.
Grounds (ii) and (vii) of the appeal deal with error of the trial judge for holding that none of the questions posed could occasion any penal or incriminatory consequences on the defendants/respondents. Learned Counsel based this allegation on the averment in the respondents reply to the defendants’ statement of defence that they were intending to institute criminal proceedings against the defendants/appellants. He contended that the answers to certain questions put in the interrogatories would be deemed as incriminatory. He referred to Section 97 of the Evidence Decree 1975 NRCD 323 which entitled a person to refuse to disclose any matter or to produce any object or writing that might incriminate him.
Learned Counsel for the appellants also cited the case of GIHOC VRS. ATTOK FISHERIES LTED [1976] 1 GLR 491 at 493 where Griffiths Randolph J harped on the immunity of witnesses from answering self-incriminatory questions.
In pronouncing upon this ground of appeal, I believe that we need to take a critical look at the principles regulating the grant or refusal to grant leave for interrogatories. The rule was formulated by Tessel MR, Cotton LT and Thesiger LT in
FISHER V. OWEN [1878] 8 Ch D. 645 on appeal, that “supposing the matter inquired offer to be an indictable offence, that was no reason for striking out an interrogatory which, being relevant, was not scandalous; and that the remedy of the defendant was to decline to answer on the ground that his answer might tend to incriminate him.” In that action the plaintiffs had sought to set aside a deed of gift purportedly executed by a testatrix in favour of her niece, the defendant, just a few day before the testatrix died.. The defendants filed a motion to have the interrogatories struck out as scandalous, irrelevant and not bona fide for the purpose of the action. The decision of the Court of Appeal in the FISHER case supra was followed in ALLHUSEN VRS. LABOUCHERE [1877-78] 3 QBD 654 where the Court of appeal held that “a party who applied to strike out interrogatories must, unless they are altogether an abuse of practice of the Court, specify those to which he objects. Questions which go merely to credit of the witness, and might be put in cross-examination cannot be put as interrogatories to a party and are as such irrelevant. Where the answer to an interrogatory might tend to criminate the person interrogated, he may refuse to answer, but the interrogatory is not therefore objectionable.” In that same case James LT rendered himself as follows: “Now I am bound to say…….that the decision in FISHER VRS. OWEN was entirely in accordance with everything that has been decided here. Nobody was ever allowed to object to a relevant question because that question tended to criminate himself. He might object to answer it, but it was never a ground of demurrer to an interrogatory, or a ground for striking it out, that the answer might involve him in a crime. I have known questions put to a man as, whether he had not forged a bill of exchange, or forged a deed which was sought to be set aside by a bill in chancery? Of course he would not be obliged to answer such questions, but the questions were put, and could not be objected to…..”
The rule or principle regarding interrogatories therefore seems to be that the person interrogated cannot legally object to questions on the ground that the answer might lead to criminal prosecution against him. His remedy lies in drawing the line between answering the questions or refusing to answer them, having regard to the consequences that attach to the decision he takes. Under the Ghanaian Law, Order 22 rule 6 of CI 47 provides sanctions that are available and enforceable against failure to comply with an order to answer. The sanctions include committal for contempt, dismissing the action or striking out the defence. See Order 22 rule of CI 47. Following the principles that have been sufficiently given in the decided authorities, it is clear that the defendants/appellants’ contention that the trial Judge erred in granting leave to put and answer questions which might incriminate them, cannot sustain. These grounds of appeal therefore fail.
This brings me to the next ground of appeal that: The learned judge erred by refusing to find that the interrogatories……are oppressive, unfair and amounted to an improper invasion of the practice and procedure of the Court. Learned Counsel for the appellants’ reasons are that, the order shifts the burden of proof on them rather than on the respondent.
The rule is that questions which are oppressive, prolix, fishing and unnecessary will not be allowed in an interrogatory. See WHITE & CO. VRS. CREDIT REFORM ASSOCIATION [1905] I KB 653 at 659 and also LOVELL VRS. LOVELL [1970] 1 WLR 1451. Those interrogatories which require verification by extensive search through records spanning many years, or complex interrogatories; or those that are voluminous and are likely to take a considerable amount of court time, or those that are abusive, are generally not allowed. It is however not oppressive merely for the plaintiff to interrogate the directors of a defendant company before trial. Where the interrogatories are not vague or embarrassing or scandalous they will be allowed.
In this case before us, learned counsel for the appellants has not shown what is oppressive or improper about the interrogatories. In principle questions which are subject-matter related, that is to say, relevant, to the determination of the case are allowed. Interrogatories must therefore and necessarily be related to the subject matter and must be necessary for disposing fairly of the cause or matter or for saving costs.
This point is illustrated with the case of MARRIOTT VRS. CHAMBERLAIN [1886] 17 QBD 154 at 163 where the Court of Appeal, speaking through Lord Esher MR. said that “the law with regard to interrogatories is now very sweeping. It is not permissible to ask the names of persons merely as being the witnesses whom the other party is going to call, and their names not forming any substantial part of the material facts…” My understanding is that where the name of a witness is itself a relevant fact, the interrogatory may be permitted. In this case some of the questions were directed directly at certain persons or officials who might, going by the averments in the statement of
defence, have purported to act on behalf of the respondent Bank.
It is relevant therefore to have more detailed information as to the matters pleaded by the defendants/appellants. The answers would obviously narrow the issues, save costs and inform fair judgment. See A-G VRS. GASKILL [1882] 20 Ch. D. 519 CA where it was held that interrogatories that are based on material facts and/or serve the purpose of narrowing the issues at the trial are generally allowable. On the question of onus of proof, the salient allegations in the plaintiff/respondents’ case were admitted by the defendant/appellants. This concession by the appellants relieves the respondent of the need to lead evidence to prove those admitted facts. The admission takes the averments thus admitted from the issues for trial. What is left remaining is the claim by the appellants that the debt had been settled and the relevant documents returned to them. Our Evidence Decree enjoins the party who asserts, to lead evidence to prove his assertion.
The case of MARRIOTT VRS. CHAMBERLAIN (supra) can be used to illustrate this point. It was an action for libel and the defendant had pleaded that the libel was true. The substance of the libel was that the plaintiff had fabricated a story that a certain circular letter purporting to have been signed by the defendant had been sent round to the defendant’s competitors in business. The plaintiff had in speeches and letters stated that he had seen a copy of the alleged letter, that two of such letters were in existence in the possession respectively of a firm of bankers and a firm of manufacturers
in Birminghan, and that his informant in the matter was a Solicitor of high standing in Birmingham. In interrogatories administered by the defendant the plaintiff was asked to state the name and address of his informant, in whose hands he had seen a copy of the letter, and the names and addresses at the persons to whom the letter had been sent, and in whose possession the two letters existed. He refused..
The court held that the interrogator is entitled to know the names of the persons alluded to by the plaintiff in order to identify them and to ascertain how far their status and character could have afforded the plaintiff any trustworthy ground for believing in the existence of the letter.
The defendant has to prove the negative; but how does he do so except by disproving the facts as alleged by the plaintiff, and how can he disprove such facts without information as to their material circumstances.
I invite counsel to bear with me little while, as I reproduce the views of Lord Esher MR in that case. The plaintiff sued in libel. The defendant pleaded justification and undertook to prove that the plaintiff fabricated the story. Lord Esher MR posed the question “What does that proof involve>” In answer, he rendered as follows: “It would in the first place be material for the defendant to prove that no such letter was ever written. That, if it could be proved, would go to shew that there could not have been any copy of such a letter, and that it was unlikely that any alleged copy really existed.
Secondly, it would be material to prove that no copy or alleged copy of any such letter ever existed. If those two facts could be established, the defendant would have proved his case, because, if there never was such a letter, or any such copy, or alleged copy, it follows that the plaintiff must have fabricated the story. It would on the other hand be material for the plaintiff by way of destroying the case set up by the defendant to prove the existence of the original letter, the existence of the copy, and that the copy was shewn to him…..”
It is by now clear, I hope, that the interrogatories requiring the names and other particulars of persons the defendants/appellants must have dealt with do not necessarily qualify for description as oppressive, unfair nor constitute improper invasion of the practice and procedures of the court. They are normal and more particularly, relevant to the issues of the cause of action.
On the question of procedure, I will simply say that where particular questions are found to be offensive then, it would afford the court a great deal of assistance that those questions are specified and the proper objections made in respect of each of them peculiarly. It would actually save the court much time if the parties were specific in drafting the questions and the objections. Where the party or parties failed to be specific, that fact would not relieve the court from taking the questions one after the other and determining their relevancy. Having stated the above which goes more to convenience, I will not except counsel’s failure to indicate which of the interrogatories he objected to, since, he could in law make a general traverse, albeit most inconvenient.
The last two grounds argued by learned counsel for the appellants are that the learned trial judge misled himself in law by holding that the denial by the Plaintiff/Respondent that the deed of guarantee and mortgage had been discharged and the deed returned to the Defendants relieves the Plaintiff of the burden of proving its allegations that it had a guarantee and a mortgage executed in its favour by the Defendants/Appellants; and that, the learned Judge misled himself in concluding that all the contrary allegations by the Defendants in their Statement of Defence occasioned a shift of the burden of proof from the Plaintiff to the Defendants and therefore that the interrogatories were proper.
I must say that a pronouncement has already been made on the propriety of the interrogatories in this judgment. The question as to who holds the burden of proof has also been discussed. Learned Counsel for the appellant based his argument principally on the decision in ATTORNEY-GENERAL VRS. GASKILL [1882] Ch. D 519. I must confess that I am unable to appreciate where learned counsel draws the line. The GASKILL case (supra) is very clear in its holdings. There is no ambiguity at all. The facts as stated in the headnotes are that:
An action was brought by the Attorney General and a local board to restrain the Defendant from building across a public footpath. The amended statement of claim alleged that at a meeting of the board held after the commencement of the action the Defendant had attended and signed an agreement for settling the action on certain terms, and the Plaintiffs sought to enforce this agreement, or, in the alternative, to restrain interference with the footpath by virtue of their original title. The Defendant, by his defence, denied the existence of any public right of way over the ground. He admitted the signature of the agreement, but alleged that it was obtained by threats and pressure after a long conversation and argument, and without his having it read and explained to him. The Plaintiffs delivered interrogatories as to the existence of a public right of way over the land, and as to what passed in the conversation at the board meeting; and at the conversation between the Defendant and the Plaintiff’s Solicitor before that meeting.
The Defendant declined to answer those interrogatories, alleging that as to the right of way he was not bound to answer as to a right which he had denied by his pleadings; and that as to the conversations he ought not to be called upon to answer till the Plaintiff’s Solicitor had been examined and cross-examined as to the conversation. It was held on appeal, by the Court of appeal “that the Defendant was bound to answer as to the existence of the right of way, for that one object of interrogatories is to enable a party to obtain admissions from the other party, and so to relieve himself from the necessity of adducing evidence.” Jessel MR’s comment at page 527 – 8 of the Report is very instructive. He stated “If these interrogatories are answered it may possibly happen that the Plaintiffs will find that they have no need to call any witnesses. Now, one of the great objects of interrogatories when properly administered, has always been to save evidence, that is to diminish the burden of proof which was otherwise on the Plaintiff.
Their object is not merely to discover facts which will inform the Plaintiff as to evidence to be obtained, but also to save the expense of proving a part of the case. It seems to me that there is no valid ground for the Defendant declining to answer these interrogatories….”
I share the views above expressed and reiterate the principle that where in a cause one party has admitted facts averred by his opponent, or where the answers to interrogatories provide the desired purpose, then the questioner, or the party whose assertion has been admitted, is relieved of the duty upon him to ordinarily prove that assertion.
In the appeal before us, the plaintiffs/respondents averment that a facility was granted the defendants/appellants was admitted by the latter. The respondent is therefore relieved of the burden to prove that the transaction took place and the facility was granted. What remains to be decided by the trial court is the subject of the avoidance of the defendant. It is in respect of these that the interrogatories were posed. Indeed looking at the whole circumstance, the interrogatories are proper and appropriate. My reason for saying so is that of the two parties, it is the defendants/appellants rather than the plaintiff/respondent who holds information regarding the alleged negotiation, accord, settlement, quantum, time, parties etc. Another aspect of the case which can be solved by the interrogatories is that, the answers might inform the plaintiff/respondent to discontinue the whole action if indeed it was satisfied that there was no longer any debt
outstanding.
In so far as the defendants/appellants hold the key to these material and highly relevant facts to the solution of the dispute, it would be in their interest to provide the answers, after which all the necessary benefits that stand to be derived from interrogatories would follow.
I will finally state that I have carefully considered all the interrogatories seriatim to see if there is any that should be disallowed. I have found none of them either offensive, irregular or objectionable according to law.
I agree with the decision and ruling of the trial judge therefore, that each one of the interrogatories is in proper from, material and relevant and should be answered by the defendants/appellants.
On the basis of the above, the ruling appealed from cannot be disturbed. It is hereby affirmed and the appeal dismissed in its entirety.
G.M. QUAYE
JUSTICE OF APPEAL
I agree. MARIAMA OWUSU
JUSTICE OF APPEAL
I also agree. I.D. DUOSE
JUSICE OF APPEAL
COUNSEL - MR. BENJAMIN OSEI TUTU FOR YONNI KULENDI FOR
DEFENDANT/APPELLANT.
MR. G.A. SARPONG FOR THE PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT.
~eb~
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF JUDICATURE
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL [CIVIL DIVISION]
SITTING AT ACCRA ON TUESDAY THE 20TH
DAY OF NOVEMBER, 2007
CORAM - OWUSU [MS] [PRESIDING], ANIN-YEBOAH & APALOO, JJA
H3/548/07
MORGAN ADZEI
V E R S U S
1. PEARSON EDUCATION LTD.
2. SEDCO PUBLICATIONS
------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff/Respondent/Respondent present.
C. Tetteh for the Plaintiff/Respondent/Respondent.
Applicant and Counsel absent.
By Court - Application is struck out for want of prosecution.
Costs of ¢4,000,000.00 (¢H400.00) for the Respondent.
[SGD.] R.C. OWUSU [MS]
JUSTICE OF APPEAL
“”” ANIN-YEBOAH
JUSTICE OF APPEAL
“”” R.K. APALOO
JUSTICE OF APPEAQL
